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    Books:

     

    • (Editor, with Mariam Thalos) Probability is the Very Guide of Life, Open Court, 2002.
    • (With Choh Man Teng) Uncertain Inference, Cambridge University Press, 2001 Typos and Corrections
    • Science and Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
    • (Editor, with Greg Carlson and Ronald Loui) Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990.
    • Theory and Measurement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
    • Epistemology and Inference, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983.
    • (Editor, with Peter Asquith) Current Research in the Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1979.
    • The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974.
    • Probability and Inductive Logic, Macmillan, New York, 1970.
    • Probability Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1969.
    • Philosophy of Science, Macmillan, New York, 1968.
    • (Editor, with Howard Smokler) Studies in Subjective Probability, John Wiley, New York, 1964; second revised edition, Krieger, Garden City, 1980.
    • (Editor, with Ernest Nagel) Induction: Some Current Issues, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1963.
    • Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1961.
    • Probability and Induction in the Cambridge School, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1956. (Dissertation.)

    Other Writings

  •       The Justification of Induction, Journal of Philosophy 53, 1956, 392-400.
  •       The Justification of Deduction, Review of Metaphysics 12, 1958, 19-25.
  •       R. B. Braithwaite on Probability and Induction, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11, 1958, 203-220.
  •       Probability and Randomness I, (abstract) Journal of Symbolic Logic 24, 1959, 316-317.
  •       Probability and Randomness II, (abstract) Journal of Symbolic Logic 24, 1959, 317-318.
  •       Demonstrative Induction, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21, 1960, 80-92.
  •       Probability and Rationality, The Philosophical Quarterly 11, 196l, 3-10.
  •       A Modest Proposal Concerning Simplicity, The Philosophical Review 70, 1961, 196-199.
  •       Comments on Braithwaite's Paper, in Induction: Some Current Issues, Kyburg and Nagel (eds), Wesleyan University Press, 1963, 196-199.
  •       Probability and Randomness,  Theoria 29, 1963, 27-55.
  •       A Further Note on Rationality and Consistency, Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963, 463-465.
  •       Recent Work in Inductive Logic, American Philosophical Quarterly 1, 1964, 249-298.
  •       Chaos and Cosmos, Illinois State University Journal 26, 1964, 3-51.
  •       Logical and Fiducial Probability, Bulletin of International Statistical Institute 40, Proceedings on the 34'th Session, Toronto University Press, Toronto, Canada, 1964, 884-901.
  •       Probability, Rationality, and a Rule of Detachment, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science II, Bar-Hillel (Ed), 1964, 301-310.
  •       Discussion: Salmon's Paper, Philosophy of Science 32, 1965, 147-151.
  •       Symposium on Inductive Evidence, Americal Philosophical Quarterly 2, 1965, 274-276.
  •       Probability and Decision, Philosophy of Science 33, 1966, 250-261.
  •       The Rule of Detachment in Inductive Logic, in Lakatos (ed.) The Problem of Inductive Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1968, 98-119.
  •       Bets and Beliefs, American Philosophical Quarterly  5, 1968, pp 54-63.
  •       (With W. Harper) The Jones Case, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19, 1968, 247-257.
  •       Measurement and Mathematics, Journal of Philosophy 66, 1969, 29-42.
  •       Two World Views, Nous 4, 1970, 337-348.
  •       Conjunctivitis, in Swain (ed.) Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief, Reidel, 1970, 55-82.
  •       More on Maximal Specificity, Philosophy of Science 37, 1970, pp 295-300.
  •       On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument, American Philosophical Quarterly 7, 1970, 229-237.
  •      Probability and Informative Inference, in V. P. Godambe and D. A. Sprott (eds), Foundations of Statistical Inference, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Toronto, 1971, 82-107.
  •       Epistemological Probability,  Synthese 23, 1971, 309-326.
  •       Review Article on Alfven, Worlds-Anti-worlds, Philosophical Forum Supplement, 1972, S4-S10.
  •       Comment on a Paper by Suppes, in Leach, Butts, and Pearce (eds) Science, Decision, and Value, Reidel, 1974, 15--18.
  •       Tyche e Athena, (in Rumanian) Bogdan (ed) Logicieni si Filosofi Contemporani, Bucharest, 1974.
  •       Randomness, in Schaffner and Cohen (eds) Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science XX, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, 137-149.
  •       Propensities and Probabilities, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 1974, 358--375.
  •       The Uses of Probability and the Choice of a Reference Class, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science  VI, Maxwell and Anderson (Eds) 1975, 262-294.
  •       Local and Global Induction, in Bogdan (ed) Local Induction, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976, 191-215.
  •       Statistical Knowledge and Statistical Inference, in W. Harper and C. Hooker (eds) Foundations of Probability, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories in Science, Col II,Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976, 315-336.
  •       Comments on 14a1 in P. Masani (ed) Norbert Wienter: Collected Works, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 33.
  •       Comments on 14b1, 15a1, and 21a1, in P. Masani (ed) Norbert Wienter: Collected Works, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1976, 83--86.
  •       Chance, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5, 1976, 355-393.
  •       All Acceptable Generalizations Are Analytic,  American Philosophical Quarterly 14, 1977, 201-210.
  •       A Defense of Conventionalism,  Nous  11, 1977, 75-95.
  •       Decisions, Conclusions, and Utilities, Synthese 37, 1977, 87-96.
  •       Randomness and the Right Reference Class,  Journal of Philosophy  74, 1977, 501-520.
  •       Reply to Professor Freudenthal, Synthese 37, 1977, 493-498.
  •       An Interpolation Theorem for Inductive Logic, Journal of Philosophy 75, 1978, 93--98.
  •       Decision Theory and DNA Research, Torch Magazine 50, 1978, 15-20.
  •       Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7, 1978, 157-180.
  •       How to Make Up a Theory, Philosophical Review 87, 1978, 84-87.
  •       The Application of Formal Methods in Philosophy of Science, in Kyburg and Asquith (eds) Current Research in Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1979, 28-39.
  •       Direct Measurement,  American Philosophical Quarterly 16, 1979, 259 -272.
  •       Tyche and Athena, Synthese 40, 1979, 415-438.
  •       Acts and Conditional Probabilities, Theory and Decision 12, 1980, 149-171.
  •       Inductive Logic and Experimental Design, in Cohen and Hesse (eds) Applications of Inductive Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, 80-91.
  •       Statistical Statements: Their Meaning, Acceptance, and Use, in Mellor (ed) Science, Belief, and Behavior, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, 161-177.
  •       Conditionalization,  Journal of Philosophy  77, 1980, 98-114.
  •       Functional Architecture and Free Will, Behavior and Brain Science 3, 1980, 143-146.
  •       Leeds' Infernal Machine, Philosophy of Science 48, 1981, 92-94.
  •       Intuition, Competence, and Performance, Behavior and Brain Science 4, 1981, 341-342.
  •       Principle Investigation, Journal of Philosophy 78, 1981, 772-778.
  •       Reply, in Bogdan (ed), Henry E. Kyburg and Isaac Levi, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982, 129-162.
  •       Self-Profile, in Bogdan (ed), Henry E. Kyburg and Isaac Levi, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982, 5-54.
  •       The Deductive Model: Does It Have Instances?  Earman (ed),Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science X,  Minneapolis 1983, 299-312.
  •       Belief, Disposition, and Rationality, in Cauman et al (eds), How Many Questions?, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983, 57-79.
  •       Rational Belief, Behavior and Brain Science 6, 1983, 231--275.
  •       Recent Work in Inductive Logic, in Lucey and Tabor (eds), Recent Work in Philosophy, Rowman and Allanfield, Totowa, N.J. 1983, 89-150.
  •       The Reference Class, Philosophy of Science 50, 1983, pp 374-397.
  •       Knowledge and the Absolute,  Behavior and Brain Science 6, 1983, 72-73.
  •       The Scope of Science, Rescher (ed), The Limits of Science,  Univ. Presses of America, 1983, 53-60.
  •       Discussion: Levi and Petersen and Direct Inference, Philosophy of Science 50, 1983, 630-634.
  •       The Role of Logic in Reason, Inference, and Decision, Behavior and Brain Science 6, 1983, 262-271.
  •       Scientific and Philosophical Argument,  Fetzer (ed) Principles of Philosophical  Reasoning, 1984, 131-150.
  •       The Logic of Statistical Reasoning, in Kotz and Johnson (eds.) Encyclopedia of Statistics, John Wiley and Sons, 1985, 117-122.
  •       The Confirmation of Quantitative Laws, Philosophy of Science 52, 1985, 1-22.
  •       Another Reply to Leeds, Philosophical Studies 48, 1985, 145--148.
  •       Probability Intervals and Rational Norms, Behavior and Brain Science 8 1985, pp. 73.
  •       The Logics of Evaluation in Basic and Clinical Science, in Schaffner (ed) The Logic of Discovery and Diagnosis in Medicine, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1986, 123-144.
  •       Intensive Grazing, New York Style, Farm Journal 1986, p. 17.
  •       Induction and Probability, Behavior and Brain Science 9, 1986, 660.
  •       Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Evidential Updating; A I Journal  31, 1987, 271-294.
  •       The Basic Bayesian Blunder, in I. MacNeill and G. Umphrey (eds) Foundations of Statistical Inference, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1987, 219-232.
  •       The Hobgoblin, The Monist 70, 1987, 141-151.
  •       Objective Probability, Levitt and Cheeseman (eds), Proceedings of the Workshop Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1987, 148-155.
  •       Objective Probabilities, McDermott (ed), IJCAI 87, Morgan Kaufman, Los Altos, 1987, 902-904.
  •       Representing Knowledge and Evidence for Decision, B. Bouchon and R. R. Yager (eds), Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1987, pp.30-40.
  •       Knowledge, Lemmer, J. F. and Kanal, L. N.  (eds): Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence  2, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1988, p. 263-272.
  •       Higher Order Probabilities and Intervals, The International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 2, 1988, 195-209.
  •       Addendum, AI Journal 36, 1988, pp. 265-266.
  •       Full Belief, Theory and Decision 25, 1988, 137-162.
  •       The Justification of Deduction in Science, in Grunbaum and Salmon (eds), The Limitations of Deductivism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, pp. 61-94.
  •       Knowledge, Lemmer, J. F. and Kanal, L. N.  (eds), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence  2, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1988, p. 263-272.
  •       Liberty, License, and Reason, Computational Intelligence 4, 1988, 89-91.
  •       Powers, in Harper, William L,. and Skyrms, Brian,  (eds), Causation in Decision, Belief Chance, and Statistics, Kluwer, 1988, pp. 71-82.
  •       Cognition and Causality, Schiffer, Stephen, and Steele, Susan (eds), Cognition and Representation, Westview, Boulder, 1988, pp. 21-33.
  •       In Defense of Intervals, in Philippe Smets, Michael R. B. Clark, Christine Froidevaux, and John Campbell (eds.) Uncertainty, Conditionals, Non-Monotonicity, and Time, 1989, passim.
  •       Higher Order Probabilities,  Kanal, Levitt, and Lemmer (eds), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 3,, Elsevier Science Publishers, North Holland, 1989, pp. 15-22.
  •       Convention, Confirmation, and Credibility, in Keith Lehrer and Marjorie Clay (eds), Knowledge and Skepticism, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 101-118.
  •       G. H. von Wright on the Logic of Conditions, in Schilpp and Hahn (eds), The Philosophy of George Henrik von Wright, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1989, 77-94.
  •       Epistemological Relevance and Statistical Knowledge, in Schachter, Levitt, Kanal, and Lemmer (eds),Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 4,  Elsevier Science Publishers, North Holland, 1990, pp. 159-168.
  •       Probabilistic Inference and Non-Monotonic Inference, in Schachter, Levitt, Kanal, and Lemmer (eds),Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 4,  Elsevier Science Publishers, North Holland, 1990, pp. 319-326.
  •       Theories as Mere Conventions, Savage (ed), Scientific Theories Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science XIV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1990, 158-174.
  •       Probabilistic Inference and Probabilistic Reasoning, Philosophical Topics: Philosophy of Science, 18, Lowell Nissen (ed), Universityof Arkansas, 1990, pp.107-116.
  •       Uncertainty and the Conditioning of Beliefs, in George M. von Furstenberg (ed), Acting Under Uncertainty: Multidisciplinary Conceptions, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 77-94.
  •       (with Fahiem Bacchus and Mariam Thalos) Against Conditionalization, Synthese 85 1990, 475-506.
  •       Giving Up Certainties, PSA 1990, pp.333-347, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, 1991. 
  •       Normative and Descriptive Elements in Knowledge Representation, Rob Cummins and John Pollock (eds), Philosophy and AI,  MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.129-140.
  •       A Two-Level system of Knowledge Representation Based on Evidential Probability, Philosophical Studies 64, 1991, pp. 105-114.
  •       Evidential Probability,  IJCAI-91: Proceedings, 1991, pp 1196-1202.
  •       Beyond Specificity, in B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager, and L. A. Zadeh (eds), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Verlag, 1991, pp.204-212.
  •       Why Do We Need Foundations for Modelling Uncertainty? Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Proceedings, 1991, pp. 438-442.
  •       (with Bulent Murtezaoglu) A Modification to Evidential Probability, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Proceedings, 1991, pp. 228-231.
  •       (with John Lemmer) Conditions for the Existence of Belief Functions Corresponding to Intervals of Belief, AAAI-91, Procedings, 1991, pp. 488-493.
  •       Measuring Errors of Measurement, in C. Wade Savage and Philip Ehrlich (eds), The Nature and Function of Measurement, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey,  1992, pp.75-92.
  •       Getting Fancy with Uncertainty, Synthese  90,  No. 2, 1992, pp. 189-204.
  •       (with Michael Pittarelli) Some Problems for Convex Bayesians, UAI-92, Proceedings, pp. 149-154.
  •       Semantics for Probabilistic Inference, UAI-92, Proceedings, pp. 142-148.
  •       Peirce and Statistics, Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science, Moore (ed), University of Alabama Press, 1993, 130-138.
  •       The Evidence of Your Own Eyes, Minds and Machines, 3, 1993, pp. 201-218.
  •       The Scope of Bayesian Reasoning, PSA-92, Vol II, Philosophy of Science Association, 1993, pp. 139-152.
  •       Just Lucky, I guess, Falling in Love with Wisdom, Karnos and Shoemaker (eds) Oxford 1993, pp. 18-21.
  •       Uncertainty Logics, in Gabbay, Hogger, and Robinson (eds) Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 397-438.
  •       Believing on the Basis of Evidence, Computational Intelligence  10, 1994, pp. 3-21, 107-115 (target Article) .
  •       'Fahiem Bacchus: Representing and Reasoning with Probabilistic Knowledge', Minds and Machines 4, 1994, pp 81-93.  (review article)
  •       Semantics for Uncertain Inference Based on Statistical Knowledge, in Mathematical Models for Handling Partial Knowledge in Artificial Intelligence, G. Coletti, Dubois, and Scozzafava (eds) Plenum Press, New York, 1995; pp. 65-82.
  •       How to Settle an Argument, in Android Epistemology, Ford, Glymour, and Hayes (eds), AAAI Press, 1995, pp. 267-278.
  •       Keynes as a Philosopher,in New Perspectives on Keynes, Cottrell and Lawlor (eds), Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1995, pp. 7-32.
  •       Dennett's Beer, in Ken Ford and Zenon Pylyshyn (eds). The Robot's Dilemma, Ablex, Norwood N.J. 1996, pp. 49-60.
  •       (with Michael Pittarelli) Set-Based Bayesianism, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 26, 1996, pp. 324-339.
  •       John B. Davis's Keynes' Philosophical Development, Economics and Philosophy 12, 1996, pp. 230-234.
  •       Probabilistic Fallacies, Behavior and Brain Science 19, 1996, p. 31.
  •       Uncertain Inference and Uncertain Conclusions,  UAI-96, Eric Horvitz and Finn Jensen (eds), Morgan Kaufman, San Francisco, 1996, pp. 365-372.
  •       Bayesian Inference and Inductive Inference, (abstract) in ISIS: Information, Statistics and Induction in Science, Dowe, Korb, and Oliver (eds), World Scientific, Singapore, 1996, p. 6.
  •       Combinatorial Semantics: Semantics for frequent validity, Computational Intelligence 13, 1997, pp. 215-257.
  •       Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers, Philosophy of Science, 64, 1997, pp. 377-410.
     
  •      Carnap, Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
  •       The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference, Journal of Philosophy 94, 1997 pp 109-125.
  •       Expertise and Context in Uncertain Inference, in D. Hoffman and Ken Ford (eds), Expertise in Context , Feltovich, Ford, Hoffman (eds) AAAI/MIT Press, 1997, pp. 499-514.
  •       Thinking about Reasoning about Knowledge, Review Article, Minds and Machines  7, 1997, pp. 103-112.
  •       Probabilistic Acceptance, Uncertainty In Artificial Intelligence, Dan Geiger and Prakash Shenoy, eds. Morgan Kaufman, 1997. pp 326-333.
  •       Families of Probabilities, in Philippe Smets and Dov Gabbay, Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, ed., 1998, pp. 227-246.
  •       Epistemology and Computing, in The Digital Phoenix, T. Bynum and J. Moor (eds), Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 37-47.
  •       Interval Valued Probabilities, in electronic collection, 1998: http:ensmain.rug.ac.be/~ipp
      Logic and the Foundations of Statistical Inference, Behavior and Brain Science 21, 1998, pp. 208-209.
  •       Approximate Validity, in Learning and Reasoning with Complex Representations, pp 61-77, Springer, edited by G. Antoniou.  1999.
  •   (with C. M. Teng) Statistical Inference as Default Reasoning, International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence 13, No. 2, 1999, pp 267-283.
  •   'Nonmonotonic Reasoning, by Grigoris Antoniou,' The Knowledge Engineering Review 14, 1999, pp 295-296.
  •       (with C. M. Teng) Choosing Among Interpretations of Probability, In Proceedings, UAI-99.
  •   The Worlds of Dr. Chow, Behavior and Brain Science  ,1999.
  •   'Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, and Teddy Seidenfeld: Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics', Journal of Philosophy 97, 2000, pp. 677-680.
  •   Probable Inference versus Probable Conclusions, in Fetzer (ed.), Science, Explanation, and Rationality, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp 77—90.
  • The Dutch Book Argument and Rational Belief, Proceedings of the PSA, 2000, pp.
  •   Probability as a Guide in Life, The Monist, 84, 2001, pp.135-152.
  • Editor, with Mariam Thalos, of a special issue of The Monist. 84, 2001.
  •   Real Logic is Nonmonotonic, Minds and Machines 11, 2001, pp 577-595
  •   Statistical Considerations in Learning from Data,  2001 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining, November 2001, Cercone, Nick and Lin, T. Y. and Wu, Xingdong, eds.
  •   (with C. M. Teng) Choosing among Approaches to Probability, New Studies in Exact Philosophy: Logic, Mathematics and Science, Bryson Brown and John Woods, Eds., Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 19-34.
  • (with C. M. Teng)  Evaluating Interpretations of Probability in the Face of Drifts  in Proceedings of the Pacific Rim AI Conference, 2002
  • Induction and Consistency in R. Elio, ed., Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 78-92.
  • Optimism, Pessimism, and Objectivity, LOFTS, ICER, July 2002
  • (with C. M. Teng) Random Sampling and Uncertain Inference, proceedings, Information Processing and the Management of Uncertainty, Annecy, 2002, 1429-1436.
  •   (with C.M. Teng)The Logic of Risky Knowledge,
    proceedings of WoLLIC, Brazil, 2002.
  • Don't take Unnecessary Chances, Synthese 132, 2002, pp. 9-26.
          Semantics for Interval Probabilities, Proceedings of FLAIRS, eds. Haller, Susan and Simmons, Gene, 2002, pp 253-257.
  • Don't Take Unnecessary Chances, Probability is the Very Guide of Life, Kyburg and Thalos, eds.Open Court, 2003, pp. 277-294.
  • Probability as a Guide in Life, Probability is the Very Guide of Life, Kyburg and Thalos, eds.Open Court, 2003, pp 135-150.
  •      Probabilistic Epistemology, American Epistemology, Ed. Quenten Smith., forthcoming.
  • Keynes on Probability, University of Bologna, forthcoming.
        
  •   The Ways of Our Errors, in Essays in Honor of Susan Haack, forthcoming.
       
  •    Are There Degrees of Belief? forthcoming, Journal of Applied logic.

 

 

 

 

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